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There is a notable shortage of empirical research directed at measuring the 
magnitude  and  direction  of  stress  effects  on  performance  in  a  controlled 
environment.  One  reason  for  this  is  the  inherent  difficulties  in  identifying  and 
isolating direct performance measures for individuals. Additionally most traditional 
work environments contain a multitude of exogenous factors impacting individual 
performance, but controlling for all such factors is generally unfeasible (omitted 
variable  bias).  Moreover,  instead  of  asking  individuals  about  their  self-reported 
stress levels we observe workers’ behavior in situations that can be classified as 
stressful. For this reason we have stepped outside the traditional workplace in an 
attempt  to  gain  greater  controllability  of  these  factors  using  the  sports 
environment  as  our  experimental  space.  We  empirically  investigate  the 
relationship  between  stress  and  performance,  in  an  extreme  pressure  situation 
(football penalty kicks) in a winner take all sporting environment (FIFA World Cup 
and UEFA European Cup competitions). Specifically, we examine all the penalty 
shootouts between 1976 and 2008 covering in total 16 events. The results indicate 
that  extreme  stressors  can  have  a  positive  or  negative  impact  on  individuals’ 
performance. On the other hand, more commonly experienced  stressors do not 
affect professionals’ performances.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On July 17 1994, at the Los Angeles Rose Bowl, Brazil attempted to secure its 4
th 
FIFA World Cup trophy, in probably one of the most memorable shootouts in World Cup 
history. One of Italy’s greatest ever players and a shining light of the tournament, Robert 
Baggio, took what was to be the final shot of the U.S. World Cup. Baggio placed the ball 
on the spot, while Taffarel, the Brazilian goal keeper, took his position on the line in front 
of 94,000 spectators. The fascinating aspect of such a “high pressure” situation is the fact 
that after 4 years of preparation, several matches before this final, 120 minutes of game 
time, and 8 prior penalty attempts, one single shot held the match outcome in the balance. 
If Baggio misses then Italy loses the greatest prize of all in football, namely the World 
Cup; if he is successful Italy still can retain a glimmer of hope of being world champions. 
As many readers may know Baggio shot not only missed but it soared meters over the 
crossbar which meant that Italy lost the tournament and Brazil became the 1994 World 
Cup champions. Did the pressure of the situation contribute to Baggio making such a 
mistake? What factors influenced such an outcome? Was it the crowd, the pressure of 
losing or just simple bad luck or in other words a random event? If it is a random result, 
there is no reason to conduct an analysis of the determinants of penalty success. In this 
case, an empirical analysis should also indicate that there are no major driving forces that 
affect the outcome. On the other hand, it is commonly reported that a team has been able 
to succeed by managing to “hold its nerve together”. Such a statement would suggest that 





In this paper we will explore penalty shootout kicks taken in the knock-out phase 
of the two major international events, the FIFA World  Cup and the UEFA Euro Cup 
competitions, working with a large data set that covers the period between 1978 and 2008 
(16 events). The “Baggio example” used above, shows that elite sports are so highly 
competitive  that  a  single  poor  choice  can  be  the  margin  between  victory  and  defeat 
(Driskell, Johnston, & Salas, 2001). In other words, this is a winner-take-all situation. 
Football games, as opposed to many other sports, provide the interesting characteristic of 
low  scoring  games.  This  often  results  in  penalty  kicks  playing  decisive  roles  in 
determining the success of a team in important international competitions like the World 
or Euro Cups, for example, not only the 1994 World Cup final was decided by penalties 
but  also,  for  example,  the  most  recent  one  in  2006.  Anecdotal  evidence  based  on 
autobiographies suggests that the stress associated with performing these kicks in such 
major international tournaments is immense (Jordet, Hartman, Visscher, & Koen, 2007), 
but surprisingly,  many coaches do not include specific penalty drills  in their training 
routines as they believe the shot success to be an entirely random process (Bonizzoni, 
1988). This lack of specific training reduces players‟ ability to use strategies that help to 
reduce the effects of stress on performance.  
 
The „inverted U‟ theory of stress indicates that at levels of stress greater than an 
individual‟s  threshold,  or  ability  to  effectively  cope,  inefficient  and  poor  choices  are 
being  made.  It  is  these  „bad‟  decisions  which  can  be  very  costly  in  terms  of  work 
performance and individual or team success (Driskell et al., 2001; Epstein & Katz, 1992). 




implementation of methods in an attempt to minimize or overcome such negative effects. 
These  methods  include  “Stress  Inoculation  Training”  (SIT)  and  “Decision  Training” 
(DT). SIT is based upon the disease inoculation concept: by exposing the athlete‟s to a 
milder form of stress it can improve the coping mechanism. Either making the athlete 
immune to or reduce the effect of possible future stressors (Meichenbaum, 2007). DT is a 
training regime that attempts to remove the decision element from athletic motor skill 
functions  via  repetitive  training  programs.  DT  is  derived  from  the  “gestalt  concept” 
where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Such that training needs to include 
environmental  and  situational  stressors  as  part  of  the  system  (Vickers,  Livingston, 
Umeris-Bohnert, & Holden, 1998). Research shows that by using this pedagogy it takes 
longer to acquire initial skill sets but display higher skill levels under stress conditions. 
This training concept has also been applied to areas outside sport, such as training of 
medical  practitioners  on  procedures  and  medical  equipment. The  research  has  shown 
improvements in both skill retention and greater ability under real stress conditions whilst 
using the specialist equipment (Thuraisingam, Levine, & Anderson, 2006).   
 
One of the problems plaguing the empirical analysis of  the stress/performance 
relationship  arises  because  of  the  difficulty  of  measuring  work  performance  well.  In 
many  occasions  performance  can  be  seen  as  a  “fuzzy”  concept  that  is  not  fully 
comparable among workers. If two workers get the same work performance score, the 
performance should really be the same on the underlying characteristic, otherwise the 
effectiveness of the statistical analysis deteriorates (Allison 1999). Another criticism is 




data. Multiple regressions are not fully able to estimate without noise the single estimate 
for the effect of stress on performance as it is impossible to measure all the variables that 
might conceivably affect performance. Allison (1999, p. 20) nicely points out “No matter 
how  many  variables  we  include  in  a  regression  equation,  someone  can  always  come 
along and say, “Yes, but you neglected to control for variable X and I feel certain that 
your results would have been different if you had done so”.  The question now arises 
whether we are able to find work environments that are close to an experimental setting. 
Several researchers stress that sports events come close to an experimental environment. 
For example, Goff and Tollison (1990, pp. 6-7) state: “Sports events take place  in  a 
controlled environment, and generate outcomes that come very close to holding “other 
things equal.” In other words, athletic fields supply real-world laboratories for testing 
economic theories. The data supplied in these labs have some advantages over the data 
normally  used  in  economic  research  (…)  The  economist  can  perform  controlled 
experiments similar to those performed by the physical and life scientists. Sports data 
afford a similar opportunity. Although the laboratory is a playing field, the data generated 
are very “clean.” Most external influences are regularly controlled by the rules of the 
game”.  
Thus,  sporting  events  can  be  seen  as  “quasi-natural  field  experiments”  where 
subjects  are  acting  in  the  natural  environment  instead  of  an  artificial  laboratory 
environment  (natural  incentives  to  perform).  It  has  been  shown  that  experiments 
performed in an environment where the test subjects are keenly aware that their behavior 
is being monitored are prone to change their normal behavior such that it is difficult to 




when recruiting subjects for (lab) experiments (e.g., “scientific do-gooders” interested in 
research). In addition, real field events such as penalty kicks are numerous and are driven 
by large financial incentives. Football players compete in an actual high stake contest 
such as the World Cup, but in a very controlled environment (Goff & Tollison, 1990). 
This realism provides researchers with a clear advantage over laboratory, self-reporting 
and other forms of experiments while maintaining the randomness of natural data (Reiley 
&  List,  2007).  The  sporting  events  are  also  relatively  controlled  events  where  all 
participants encounter the same environmental variables. This allows for a large number 
of  the  exogenous  (external)  factors  to  be  controlled  when  exploring  the  relationship 
between stress and performance. In addition, one should note that penalty shootouts are 
even  more  controlled  than  the  regular  game  period  as  team  interactions  (individual 
performance  is  affected  by  teammates’  performance  directly  (e.g.,  assists  etc.),)  for 
example, are no longer that relevant.  
 
Thus, in this paper we are going to explore the impact of a set of different stress 
factors on players‟ performance. Our hypothesis is that less predictable, anticipated and 
experienced  stress  factors  have  a  stronger  impact  on  performance  than  routinely 
experienced  stress  determinants.  In  addition,  athletes  react  to  incentives.  A  large 
difference between individual/team expected benefits of success and the expected costs 
of  failure  leads  to  behavioral  consequences.  A  large  positive  difference  promotes 






II.  THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The last few decades has seen a major expansion into the exploration of causes 
and consequences of stress or the perception of stress in the work environment (see, e.g., 
Holt, 1993). As well as the physical and mental health issues, an additional consequence 
of stress is the breakdown in judgment and rational decision making and the generation of 
mistakes. Research into the medical profession has shown that doctors report making 
serious mistakes in patient care, directly due to the effect of working under high levels of 
stress (Reason, 1990; Rosenthal, 1995) and not because of incompetence, lack of skill or 
training (Firth-Cozens & Greenhalgh, 1997). Furthermore, other experiments have shown 
a clear tendency for individuals working under stressful conditions to incorrectly weight 
options (Wright, 1974). Early studies explored the emergency decision making process 
and found that time and pressure seemed to be major determinants of hyper-vigilance 
(Schultz, 1966; Janis & Mann, 1977). The inability to scan alternative options and the 
incorrect weighting of payoffs creates a problem within traditional choice  models  by 
leading  to  inefficient  or  poor  outcomes  (Keinan,  1987).  As  stress  levels  increase 
individuals are less able to make rational choices, leading to larger choice impairment 
(Meichenbaum, 2007). In these situations individuals may fall back on other non-rational 
methods of making decisions. Political psychology literature has shown that under stress 
individuals  act  as  “satisfiers”  instead  of  the  expected  “optimizers”.  In  the  case  of 
policymakers it has been found that they rely on ideological or operations principles as 
decision guides rather than a detailed analysis of any particular policy issue (George, 




however explaining how little or how much stress is required to affect decision making 
has been in contention (Jamal, 1984). 
 
The  literature  describing  the  relationship  between  stress  and  performance  has 
generated many contradictory models (Edwards, Guppy, & Cockerton, 1992). Sullivan 
and Bhagat (1992) illustrated four of the more common models which included: 1) higher 
levels  of  performance  require  at  least  some  moderate  level  of  stress;  2)  a  positively 
correlated  relationship  such  that  only  through  high  stress  could  high  performance  be 
achieved;  3)  a  negatively  correlated  relationship  where  high  stress  results  in  low 
performance  levels;  4)  and  finally  that  stress  and  performance  are  totally  unrelated. 
Instead of a linear model, psychology has worked with a curvilinear (the inverted-U) 
model (see Allen, Hitt, & Greer 1982; Meglino, 1977; Yerkes & Dodson, 1908), where 
low  levels  of  stress  spur  individual  performance  upwards  but  after  a  threshold  point 
additional stress becomes detrimental to performance. Within the inverted-U model, two 
post  threshold  stages  of  performance  degradation  have  been  well  discussed  within 
psychological and sports literature (see e.g. Baumeister, 1984; Baumeister & Showers, 
1986). These have been identified as the „choking‟ and „panicking‟ stages (Beilock & 
Carr, 2001; Bourne & Yaroush, 2003; Lehner, Seyed-Solorforough, O'Connor, Sak, & 
Mullin,  1997).  Choking  behavior  occurs  with  a  shift  from  the  normal  automatic  and 
reactive  response  behavior,  to  the  more  laborious  and  time  consuming  step-by-step 
thought process. Athletes begin to “second guess” the automatic response of the highly 
practiced and well-learned repetitive skills. The over-thinking of actions result in slowed 




degrading of reactions and performance. An individual‟s behavior reverts to primitive 
maladaptive instinctive thinking (Epstein & Katz, 1992). Here the panicked individual 
obsessively focuses on singular aspects or tasks to the neglect of all else, resulting in an 
inability to respond to any changes outside the panic focus. It was this behavioral reaction 
that was, for example, perceived to be responsible for a catastrophic and tragic event 
1988, which saw the USS Vincennes mistakenly shoot down an Iran Air passenger flight. 
The  investigation  found  that  the  US  officer  in  charge  of  target  identification  was 
exhibiting the panicked obsessive state triggered by excessive levels of stressed (Collyer 
& Malecki, 1998).  
 
Two distinct subsets of stressors that influence the decision making process has 
been identified: “task-related” and “ambient stressors” (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998). 
The  task  related  stressors  include:  workload  and  time  pressures,  uncertainty  and 
ambiguity,  or  auditory  overload.  Ambient  stressors  include:  auditory  interference, 
performance  pressure,  or  fatigue  and  sustained  operations.  Workload  pressures 
specifically  relate  to  number  of  tasks  an  individual  is  able  to  successfully  handle 
simultaneously (by increasing the number of task the levels of stress increases). Whereas 
time pressure stressors is directly related to the amount of perceived time remaining to 
complete  a  task,  as  the  perceived  window  shortens  stress  levels  increase.  When  the 
number  of  tasks  exceeds  the  individual‟s  ability  to  process  or the  time  remaining  to 
complete  a task  is  less  than  the  amount  of  time  perceived  to  be  required,  individual 
performances begins to wane and more mistakes are made. Uncertainty and ambiguity 




stress occurs when the individual is unsure of the role they are supposed to fulfill or 
perform (this stressor type is not expected to be observed in this setting). Finally auditory 
overload occurs when too much information is being passed to an individual, through 
auditory means, to be coherently received and understood. Such as receiving instructions 
or  auditory  cues  in  a  noisy  work  environment  with  many  other  auditory  distracters 
present. In general we would expect to observe in the penalty  shoot out process that 
ambient stressors are more dominant than task related. Task related stressors are more 
present during normal match play.   
 
This  is  quite  different  and  separate  from  the  „ambient  stressor‟  of  auditory 
interference,  whereby  excessive  noise  levels  interfere  with  normal  thought  processes, 
such as crowd noises or military personnel operating under gunfire. Work performance 
pressure has been well documented within the sports field (see, e.g., Beilock & Carr, 
2001),  where  a  heightened  sense  of  self-consciousness  creates  high  stress  levels  and 
degraded performance. Famous examples of this can be observed in the 1996 Masters 
Golf  Tournament,  with  Greg  Norman‟s  final  round  collapse.  In  this  stressor  players 
„know‟ a large audience is watching their move and awaiting possible mistakes, causing 
players to choke and over think what should be natural sporting movements and actions. 
Although Cannon-Bowers and Salas (1998) investigation was done with a military focus, 
the  stress  factors  are  consistent  with  Bourne  and  Yaroush  (2003). They  performed  a 
review  of  stress  factors  for  the  National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Administration 
(N.A.S.A.), an equally high stress non-military setting. The extended set of stress factors 




pressures. As discussed in the first section, one of the advantages of using the sporting 
arena as the investigation ground is the chance to control many exogenous factors (hold 
them constant) which is generally less possible in other environments. In the case of the 
extended stress factors within a penalty shoot-out situation we observe that all players are 
subjected  to  identical  environmental  conditions.  Thus  extremes  of  temperature  and 
prolonged workloads are the same for all players which helps to isolate the influence of 
other factors, namely, for example, auditory, work performance, and social stressors.  
 
Research has shown that auditory stressors, which are the noise effect from large 
crowds, are known to have an impact on both players and referees alike (Greer, 1983; 
Nevill, Balmer, & Williams, 2002; Pollard, 1986; Schwartz & Barsky, 1977). Recent 
studies into the effects of noise on performance have found that noise levels appear to 
have a significant effect on both decision making and reaction times (Kjellberg, 1990; 
Kjellberg, Landstrom, Tesarz, Soderberg, & Akerlund, 1996; Larsson, 1989). The noise 
effect is driven by audience volume of attendance at matches, for this reason we use 
absolute crowd size as a proxy measurement for auditory stress. Additionally we have 
used the absolute crowd size divided by the stadium capacity as a proxy for the relative 
crowd size.  This allows for control of the perceived crowd size. The sound generated in 
massive stadiums with a seating capacity of 100,000 only containing a crowd of 40,000 
are perceived much different to a smaller stadium filled to close to capacity with the same 
40,000 individuals. In addition, the performance is not only done in front of a large crowd 
at the games but also being aware of a large television audience. It has been shown that 




externalities due to self-consciousness (Baumeister, 1984; Beilock & Carr, 2001). This 
effect could be exacerbated in context of World and Euro Cups as the viewer audience 
can exceed 700 million in the finals. This would also indicate that international events 
like the Olympics and World Cups are some of the most stressful environments endured 
by elite athletes, due in part to the large viewing audience.  
 
  Additionally, the virtue of competitive sport and the standing of the competition 
itself  create  further  work  related  stressors  that  is  intrinsically  linked  to  the  very 
nature/design of the work. In drawn/tied matches the penalty shootout rules are initiated, 
creating a sudden death win/lose scenario. Penalty shots are comparable to a winner-take-
all situation, where the outcome of any single kick to either win or lose, places much 
greater stress upon players (Jordet et al., 2007). The more comfortable situation for a 
kicker is the case where his team can win the game if he is able to achieve a goal. A 
successful kick will lead to large individual and team benefits. On the other hand, missing 
the opportunity means that the game is open again (“nothing is lost”). In other words, the 
expected costs of missing are substantially lower than the expected benefits of success. If 
individuals react positively to such incentives, one would predict that player performance 
would be better in this situation (positive stress effect). On the other hand, the kicker is 
confronted with a high expected costs in a situation of a relative disadvantage (when 
missing means losing), while the expected benefits are much smaller (team has not won 
yet and player has not made it happen). This can be defined as a negative stress situation. 
One may predict that in such a circumstance players may be more vulnerable to mistakes 




making a goal. The positive or negative effects are even large once we also consider the 
goalkeeper‟s incentives that work in the opposite direction. The literature on football has 
disregarded  such  a  potential  positive  or  negative  effect.  McGarry  and  Franks  (2000) 
report  with  their  simulation  calculating  scoring  percentages  that  later  kicks  are  more 
important  than  early  kicks.  Anxiety  increases  with  kick  importance  leading  to  fewer 
goals.  They  stressed  that  the  goal  probability  follows  an  inverted-U  curve  (least 
successful  kicks  early  and  late).  On  the  other  hand,  Jordet  et  al.  (2007)  suggest  a 
negatively linear curve with higher anxiety progressively resulting in a poorer outcome. 
Our predicted positive effect in case of a relative advantage would smooth out a non-
linear relationship at the right hand side of the function, e.g., making the right hand side 
more linear. To investigate kick importance or in other words positive stress (expected 
benefits are substantially larger than expected costs) and negative stress (expected costs 
are substantially larger than expected benefits) we have included two dummy variables, 
namely a single kick that can result in an overall game win or loss (PRESSURE TO WIN 
and PRESSURE TO LOSE).  
 
In addition, the relative importance of success and the level of perceived stress 
vary with the game level. As the finals series unfold and teams progress through the 
varying  stages,  e.g.  round  of  16,  semi-finals,  finals,  the  opportunity  costs  of  losing 
increase. The perceived costs are higher for losing in the finals compared to the quarter-
finals, given the closer proximity to the ultimate success of winning the competition. In 
this way we have encoded the varying levels in order of importance from 1 to 4, the 




quarter finals = 2, semi-finals = 3 and the final = 4, the normal round matches are not 
included as the penalty process is only used in the knockout stages. Both game level and 
shot outcome can be considered as work pressure stressors, as both are inherent factors of 
the tournament and rules structure. Thus we have created a proxy measures for game 
level.  
 
  As  a  robustness  test  we  also  consider  social  stressors.  Football  tradition  may 
induce  further  pressure  to  players  in  the  penalty  shootout.  Players  of  nations  with  a 
stronger football tradition bear the additional burden of expectation pressure. Nations that 
have  long  national  football  traditions  and  especially  those  national  teams  with 
outstanding national success could have a greater expectation of success, thus increasing 
the pressure upon players to perform. However, such players  may  have also a  better 
ability to succeed. Thus, to control for such a social stressor, we control in this case also 
for players‟ ability.  
 
III. METHOD 
Design and Procedure 
  Explored in this paper are the penalty shootout kicks taken in the knock-out phase 
of the FIFA World Cup and the UEFA Euro Cup competitions. The rules pertaining to 
elimination games when after normal game time and a period of extra time has expired 
and team scores remain tied, penalty kicks are used to determine a winner (FIFA, 2008).  
The penalty shootout process is as follows: 5 players from each team are selected to take 




penalty spot opposed by only the opposition goalkeeper; the result is a best out of 5, a 
team wins by being the one to score the most goals out of the 5 shots; if at the end of the 
5 shots the score is still a draw then the penalty shootout continues one pair at a time, 
where a single shooter from each team attempts to score until the tie is broken and one 
team wins; players are only allowed to shoot once until every member of the team has 
shot  at  least  once.  Such  process  places  the  full  weight  of  game’s  outcome  upon  the 
shoulders of each kicker and goalkeeper in turn, determining the stresses placed upon 
these players will give a clearer picture of its effects on the success of penalty shots 
(isolation of an individual performance in a team sport). A penalty shootout is therefore 
much more controlled than performances during the main game.  
 
  The data for this analysis has been gathered through various method and sources 
including:  FIFA  game  footage,  the  official  FIFA  web  archives  and  other  football 
databases. The data included player, game, tournament and historical data such as player 
statistics (e.g., age and years of international experience before the start of a particular 
tournament),  game  statistics  (scores,  outcomes,  crowd  sizes),  tournament  statistics 
(competition,  game  stage,  etc)  and  historical  statistics  (e.g.,  FIFA  association,  world 
rank). We have calculated players‟ years of international experience, as the number of 
years since their first international debut. We identify all the kickers‟ and goalkeepers 
from the penalty shootout process in World and Euro Cup tournaments cover a large time 
period of over 30 years (1976-2008), resulting in 326 individual observations. This period 
covers 9 Euro cups but only 7 World Cups, due to the early adoption of the penalty 




being taken from the UEFA tournament and the remaining 57% coming from the FIFA 
World Cups. A complete list of the descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 1. The 
average age of players varies depending on the role; we observe a clear age difference (-
3.3 years) with goalkeepers on average 3 years older than the kickers (30 years and 27 
years respectively). In line with this age difference we observe that goalkeepers have 
more international experience (6.2 years) than the opposing kickers (4.96 years). There is 
very little difference in the world rank position (-0.126) where the average world rank of 
the national teams for kickers is (40.02) and goalkeepers is (40.15). However, we do 
observe  a  large  difference  in  the  club  ranking  (-31.37)  between  kickers  (77.6)  and 
goalkeepers (109.06), indicating that kickers play for clubs of much higher rank (lower 
number is higher rank). Moreover, we observe very little differences in regards to FIFA 
membership (-0.683 years). Finally, we observe that 28% of all penalty shot are pressure 
shots, to either win (12.9%) or lose (15.1%). 
 
  The world ranking for national teams in this respect has not utilized the current 
FIFA  Coca-Cola  world  ranking  system,  as  this  system  was  not  in  place  until  1993. 
Therefore we have utilized the points system already in place for World Cups, in the 
variable NATIONAL WORLD RANK. Points are allocated such: 3 points for wins, 1 
point for draws and nothing for losing, however prior to 1994 wins were allocated 2 
points and a draw 1 point. We have accumulated this point‟s allocation over all the World 
Cups. Thus, teams with higher point accumulation at that period of time were ranked 
higher.  The  ranking  of  each  team  was  determined  by  points  immediately  prior  to 




team over the duration of the analysis period, such that a continually evolving world 
ranking system has been used. This system allows us to demonstrate the effect of prior 
success in World Cups, as all matches won or drawn have an accumulation effect on the 
ranking. In this way our NATIONAL WORLD RANK variable, is also a proxy for the 
social pressure due to expectations. We have also included players‟ club world ranking at 
the time of the penalty process, utilizing the IFFHS world club ranking tables such that 
the  lower  the  value  the  higher  the  club  ranking  position  (IFFHS,  2009).  As  well  as 
ranking  statistics,  we  have  included  the  variable  for  duration  of  national  FIFA 
membership (years). This variable is a proxy that measures the level of football tradition 
within a country (see Torgler 2006, 2008). 
 
  Our  data  variables  include  not only  the  absolute  values  of  variables  like  age, 
experience, world rank and FIFA membership but we also investigate the difference of 
these variables (e.g., DIFF.EXP.: kicker‟s experience – goalkeepers‟ experience).  
    
Used Statistical Analysis 
We use a multivariate regression analysis or specifically a probit model due to the 
non-linear and binary nature of the dependant variable. The dependant variable in this 
analysis is a dummy variable used to indicate either success or failure of a particular 
penalty shot (failure/miss = 0; success/goal = 1). Failure of a penalty shot encompasses 
all eventualities where the kicker was not successful in scoring a goal. This includes the 
goalkeeper  saving/stopping  the  shot,  the  shot  hitting  the  uprights  or  cross-bar  and 




other words, our dependent outcome variable has two values, goal or miss. We therefore 
use a probit model instead of a linear regression mode. As a linear regression model is 
unbounded, the model can produce negative predictions and predictions exceeding unity 
and therefore unrealistic probabilities. It is also not possible to arbitrarily constrain the 
point predictions outside the unit interval to either 0 or 1 as the error term would not 
satisfy the assumption of homoskedasticity (Baum, 2006). A probit model allows us to 
solve these problems  implementing a  non-linear function that takes on values strictly 
between zero and one. Alternatively, one could also estimate a logit model as variations 
of these nonlinear functions have been suggested, but we prefer to use a model where 
such a function is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.  
 
As  the  estimated  probit  coefficients  are  based  on  a  non-linear  estimation 
technique, we cannot interpret the coefficients readily in terms of the quantitative sizes of 
the effects. We therefore calculate the marginal effects to find the quantitative effect of 
an independent variable. The marginal effect indicates the penalty success rate or the 
probability of success when the independent variable increases by one unit.  We compute 
the marginal effects at the multivariate point of means exploring therefore a marginal 
change of the variable x from the average x.  
 
To isolate the effect of stress and performance, we control for individual factors 
(age,  experience,  position,  ability),  team  factors  (team  strength  and  tradition)  and 
tournament (dummy variables for all the events, but also in some regressions a dummy 




acclimation training have been found to be valid mechanisms for displacing stress effects 
(Johnston,  Poirer,  &  Smith-Jentsch,  1998).  Acclimation  can  be  achieved  through 
experience, as individuals become more familiar with the working environment and skills 
are less impacted by stressors and make better decisions (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998; 
Wright, 1974). However, as we are not privy to the training regimes of teams we are 
unable to construct any direct proxies in relation to any stress reduction activity like SIT 
or DT directly. However, we checked the robustness of our results using team dummy 
variables to take into account unobserved team effects or we control for example, for the 
quality  of  the  team  through  their  current  international  ranking  position  in  further 
regressions.  These  team  dummy  variables  have  included  every  team  for  the  two 
competitions, e.g., a dummy was created for Brazil for each of the matches in which they 
participated in the dataset, in this manner we control for team effects.     
 
IV. RESULTS 
Table 2 presents the results. As can be seen, we add the stress factors sequentially in the 
specification starting in equation (1) with the dummy variables PRESSURE SHOT TO 
WIN and PRESSURE SHOT TO LOSE, and exploring  in the  next also the absolute 
(LOG  CROWD  SIZE)  and  the  relative  crowd  size  (CROWD  SIZE/STADIUM 
CAPACITY)  and  then  also  the  game  level  situation  within  the  tournament.  In  all 
estimations we also use time dummies to control for unobserved time effects. To take 
into account a player‟s characteristic we control in a first step for kicker‟s and goalies‟ 
age.  The  results  indicate  that  the  two  variables  PRESSURE  SHOT  TO  WIN  and 




in  situation  of  a  relative  advantage  having  the  chance  of  winning  the  game  with  a 
successful penalty increases the probability of a goal by around 17%. On the other hand, 
being in relative disadvantaged situation (pressure to lose) leads to a decrease of success 
by around 45%. Thus, this is a quite significant effect and it is interesting to observe that 
the marginal effects are stronger in case of a relative disadvantage compared to relative 
advantage. Negative stress has therefore a stronger impact on performance than positive 
stress. Looking at all the other proxies for stress (relative and absolute crowd size, game 
level)  we  observe  that  these  factors  have  no  statistically  significant  impact  on  the 
probability of a penalty performance. Based on our hypothesis, this is not a surprise. Such 
international professional players are used to play in front of a large absolute and relative 
audience.  In  addition,  we  observe  a  selection  effect.  The  process  to  become  an  elite 
athlete would  include demonstration of  individual  ability to handle such a  stress and 
those unsuccessful individuals would have left the sport prior to reaching this level. On 
the other hand, players might be less used to semi-finals or final in such big international 
tournaments which suggest that the stress level increases and that such an increase is 
correlated  with  a  performance.  However,  they  may  experience  similar  important 
international  games  at  the  club  level  (e.g.,  Champions  League).  Many  of  the  best 
international players work for Spanish, Italian, English or German clubs. Maguire and 
Pearton  (2000)  reported  that  European  clubs  employed  62  percent  of  the  players 
participating  in  the  1998  World  Cup  in  France.  Moreover,  players  can  adapt  to  the 
situation insofar as they know in advance when they are going to play the game. In other 
words,  they  can  prepare  themselves  mentally  and  physically  for  that  event.  This  is 




throughout the game also affects trainer‟s choice and player‟s willingness to shoot the 
penalty (e.g., fatigue, still part of the team, injuries, bad day etc.). Studying the videos 
during  the  break  before  the  penalty  shootout  clearly  indicates  that  the  trainers  are 
preparing or finalizing the list of penalty kickers and the strategy to conduct at that time. 
In addition, in many of the cases a player does not know in advance whether he will be in 
a situation of “pressure to win” or “pressure to lose”. Such a higher level of uncertainty 
reduces individuals‟ mental and physical preparation for such an event. In addition, we 
have stressed in the introduction that athletes react to incentives. This is confirmed with 
our analysis. A large difference between individual/team expected benefits of success and 
the expected costs of failure seemed to affect players‟ stress levels and therefore their 
performance. A large positive difference promotes performance (positive stress) while a 
negative difference reduces performance (negative stress). We also observe that age is a 
significant factor on performance stress of kickers, such that as the age of the kicker 
increases so does the probability of being unsuccessful thus increasing the stress levels, 
however the age effect does not appear to be statistically significant for goalkeepers.  
 
  We conduct several robustness tests. A summary of the results are reported in 
Table 3.  For simplicity, we only report the results of our key  independent variables, 
namely  our  stress  factors.  The  results  obtained  with  these  additional  variables  are 
discussed in the main text. The continuous age variable has been re-coded in line with 
Jordet et al. (2007) into categories (22 and below: young; between 23 and 28: medium; 
28 and older (older)). The results show that even after splitting the age variable for both 




stress factors (see specification 6). However, we do observe that middle age kickers are 
significantly  less  likely  to  be  successful  (-13.7%)  than  their  younger  counterparts 
(statistically significant at a 10% level). Furthermore, we do not observe any significant 
change for goalkeepers across the three age groupings. We also control for kickers‟ and 
goalkeepers‟ experience using the number of years playing at the international level as a 
proxy for experience (specification 7). Moreover, instead of adding the single goalkeeper 
and kicker factors we also build the differences in experiences. The results show that the 
single  factor of  experience  does  not  have  a  significant  effect  on  the  outcome  of  the 
penalty process). However, the difference in experience is statistically significant at 10% 
level, having noticeable effect on the outcome. A marginal decrease in a kicker‟s relative 
experience advantage by one year (from the average) reduces probability of success by 
around 1%. One should note that these two specifications indicate that the quantitative 
effects for PRESSURE SHOT TO WIN and PRESSURE SHOT TO LOSE don‟t change 
substantially.  The  coefficients  remain  statistically  significant.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
other stressor factors are still not statistically significant. 
 
  Next,  one  can  stress  that  goal-scoring  skills  are  derived  from  positional  roles 
(Jordet  et  al.,  2007).  Players  with  the  primary  task  of  scoring  goals  may  perform 
differently than other players in the penalty kick. We therefore control in specification 8 
for  players‟  position  within  the  game  with  dummy  variables  (forward,  midfield,  and 
defender).  The  results  indicate  that  the  position  of  a  player  has  ceteris  paribus  no 
influence  on  the  penalty  success.  In  the  same  specification  we  also  control  for  the 




players has shown that foot dominance is reflected in positional bias of the kick. A right-
footed kicker is much more successful shooting to their natural side (which is to the right 
from the perspective of the goalkeeper), resulting in better rates of success (Chiappori, 
Levitt  &  Groseclose,  2002).  However,  this  does  not  ensure  kick  direction  as  if  the 
placement becomes predictable the goalkeeper will  have a  much better probability of 
successfully stopping/catching the ball (Leela & Comissiong, 2009). Our results show 
that there are no differences in success between right- and left-footed kickers. 
 
  Furthermore, we extend the previous estimations controlling in a better manner 
for players‟ ability. One can argue that experience, measured as the years of international 
experience, may already help to control for players‟ ability and skills. This allows to 
better  isolate  the  impact  of  stress  on  performance  otherwise  one  can  criticize  that 
observed performance differences are driven by ability or skills. Thus, to further control 
for  ability  or  skills  we  also  control  in  which  club  the  player  is  active  (club  world 
ranking). The club ranking should be strongly correlated with players‟ skills and abilities. 
Also here we run estimations with the absolute values and the differences between the 
players. As shown in specification (9) we observe little change in our main stress factors. 
Interestingly,  both  ability/skill  proxies  (and  the  differences  between  kicker  and 
goalkeeper) have no statistically significant effect on players‟ shot success. That might be 
a  reason  why  many  trainers  believe  as  discussed  previously  that  penalty  shots  are  a 
random process that does not require substantial training and preparation. Additionally 
the  difference  between  club  ranks  of  kicker  and  goalkeeper  is  not  significant.  These 




playing in elite European competitions (low quality difference). Table 3 indicates that the 
results in regards to our stress factors remain robust.  
 
  To  measure  also  team  quality  in  further  estimations,  we  explore  a  variety  of 
different  cases:  a  World  Cup  ranking  based  on  past  performances  in  World  Cups 
(NATIONAL WORLD RANK, see previous discussion), the number of World Cup wins 
in the past before the competition started, and the duration of FIFA association. In line 
with previous estimations we explore first single averages and then differences. Besides 
competence,  these  variables  may  also  relate  to  social  stress.  Players  are  national 
representatives and as such bear the additional burden of expectation pressure, driven by 
national  pride  and  tradition.  Nations  that  have  long  national  football  traditions  and 
especially those national teams with outstanding national success could have a greater 
expectation of success, thus increasing the pressure upon players to perform (Torgler, 
2004). However, as a player from such a team may also be better, it is useful to control 
for players‟ ability in such regressions. As can be seen we control in these specifications 
for international experience and club affiliation (club ranking). The results indicate that 
even when controlling for team quality the quantitative effect of our main stress factors 
don‟t change substantially. On the other hand, the proxies we have used to measure social 
stress (expectation and tradition) are mostly not statistically significant. Such a result is 
consistent with our hypothesis and can also be explained using the Stress Inoculation 
Training (SIT) process. The high expectations are not instantaneous in nature, but build 
over  periods  of  time.  Players  were  raised  within  such  a  football  culture  where 





  We  also  run  estimations  with  team  dummy  variables  to take  into  account  for 
unobserved team heterogeneity of team effects (see specifications 10 to 12). This may 
cover  issues  such  as  training  intensity  or  training  programs,  trainer‟s  strength,  social 
cohesion, talent pool etc. It is also a proxy for historical strength or football culture. 
 
  In sum, previously obtained findings are robust, even after subjecting the stress 
factors to numerous robustness tests controlling for aspects such as individual factors 
(position, skill and ability) or team factors (e.g., team strength, football tradition). The 
marginal effects for our two key variables (PRESSURE SHOT TO WIN and PRESSURE 
SHOT  TO  LOSE)  hardly  change  and  coefficients  remain  in  all  cases  statistically 
significant.  On  the  other  hand,  the  other  stressors  are  consistently  not  statistically 
significant. Thus, the previous results obtained in Table 2 remain robust confirming our 
hypothesis that less predictable, anticipated and experienced  stressors have a stronger 
impact  on  performance  than  routinely  experienced  or  predictable  stress  determinants. 
Moreover, players react to positive and negative stressors, while the effect for a negative 
stressor on performance is substantially larger.  
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This  study  builds  upon  prior  research  investigating  the  relationships  between 
work stressors and performance, through the examination of a high pressure situation in 
the working environment of elite athletes. It explore penalty shootout kicks taken in the 




UEFA  Euro  Cup  competitions,  working  with  a  large  data  set  that  covers  the  period 
between 1978 and 2008 (16 events). Penalty shootouts are so highly competitive that a 
single  poor  choice  can  be  the  margin  between  victory  and  defeat  (winner-take-all 
situation).  
 
We  explore  different  stress  factors  and  find  that  predicable,  anticipated  and 
experienced stress factors (routinely experienced stress determinants) have no impact on 
performance. On the other hand, less predictable anticipated stressors (individual final 
shot stressors), appear to be very important in understanding performance success. In 
addition,  athletes  react  to  incentives.  A  large  difference  between  individual/team 
expected  benefits  of  success  and  the  expected  costs  of  failure  leads  to  behavioral 
consequences. A large positive difference promotes performance (positive stress) while a 
negative difference reduces performance (negative stress). Being in situation of a relative 
advantage having the chance of winning the game with a successful penalty increases the 
probability of a goal by around 17%. On the other hand, being in relative disadvantaged 
situation (pressure to lose) leads to a decrease of success by around 45%. Thus, this is a 
quite  significant  effect  and  it  is  interesting  to  observe  that  the  marginal  effects  are 
stronger  in  case  of  a  relative  disadvantage  compared  to  relative  advantage.  Negative 
stress has therefore a stronger impact on performance than positive stress.  
 
Thus, the effect of high stress on the performance of elite athletes is empirically 
observable  in  this  sporting  environment.  Here  a  poor  decision  can  result  in  the 




result  could  be  much  worse.  A  poor  decision  made  by  emergency  workers,  doctors, 
military leaders or the CEO of multinational corporations could result in the loss of lives, 
jobs or billions of dollars.  
 
The  present  study  has  limitations  that  need  to  be  acknowledged  and  suggest 
possible avenues of future research in this area. A central concern to the future study of 
stress and performance is that of measurement, successful testing of stress impacts on 
individuals requires good and comparable measures of individual performance. The use 
of  the  sporting  environment  to  examine  the  stress/performance  relationship  has  both 
limitations  and  advantages.  In  the  introduction  we  have  discussed  in  the  detail  the 
advantages.  The  sports  environment  provides  the  ability  to  observe  behavioral 
consequences in a control environment that allows isolation the potential impact of stress 
on  performance  in  a  better  manner.  One  limitation  of  adopting  a  non-standard  work 
environment is that translating the results back into the traditional work environment may 
be difficult. In other words one should be care in generalizing from the results of research 
working with sports data to the population as a whole. For example, players’ average 
salary  is  far  above  the  median  earnings  of  full-time,  full-year  equivalent  workers. 
However, it has been shown that sports athletes are motivated by similar forces that affect 
workers in general and sports labor markets can been seen as a laboratory for observing 
whether  some  theoretical  propositions  have  a  chance  of  being  correct  (Kahn,  2000). 
Given  the  importance  of  stress  in  the  workplace  we  hope  that  the  use  of  the  sports 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics. 
 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Min  Max 
KICKER AGE  325  26.917  16  35 
KICKER INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE   325  4.96  0  16 
KICKER CLUB RANK   325  77.637  1  250 
KICKER NATION WORLD RANK   325  40.028  1  130 
KICKER FIFA MEMBER   325  88.797  15  143 
KICKER WORLD CUP WINS  325  0.7938  0  4 
GOALIE AGE  325  30.218  21  41 
GOALIE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE  325  6.2  0  20 
GOALIE CLUB RANK  325  109.006  1  250 
GOALIE NATION WORLD RANK  325  40.154  1  130 
GOALIE FIFA MEMBER  325  89.48  15  143 
GOALIE WORLD CUP WINS  325  0.8031  0  4 
LOG CROWD SIZE  325  10.835  9.796  11.453 
CROWD SIZE/STADIUM   CAPACITY  325  0.945  0.333  1.538 
PRESSURE SHOT TO WIN   325  0.129  0  1 
PRESSURE SHOT TO LOSE   325  0.151  0  1 
DIFFERENCE AGE  325  -3.302  -18  12 
DIFFERENCE INTERNATIONAL 
EXPERIENCE 
325  -1.24  -18  13 
DIFFERENCE CLUB RANK  325  -31.37  -249  247 
DIFFERENCE WORLD RANK  325  -0.1262  -83  83 
DIFFERENCE FIFA MEMBER  325  -0.683  -97  97 


























Table 2: Stress determinants 
 
Probit    (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5) 
PRESSURE SHOT TO 
WIN 
0.817**  0.814**  0.794**  0.800**  0.796** 
2.41  2.40  2.36  2.37  2.32 
0.174  0.174  0.170  0.171  0.168 
PRESSURE SHOT TO 
LOSE 
-1.26***  -1.26***  -1.284***  -1.276***  -1.31*** 
-5.73  -5.74  -5.81  -5.77  -5.84 
-0.441  -0.442  -0.450  -0.447  -0.456 
LOG CROWD SIZE    0.186  0.256  0.059  -0.034 
  0.53  0.72  0.14  -0.08 
  0.053  0.073  0.017  -0.010 
CROWD 
SIZE/STADIUM   
CAPACITY 
    -2.62  -1.89  -1.578 
    -1.46  -0.93  -0.77 
    -0.742  -0.535  -0.442 
GAME LEVEL         0.121  0.201 
      0.77  1.23 
      0.034  0.056 
KICKERS AGE           -0.041* 
        -1.74 
        -0.011 
GOALIES AGE           0.039 
        1.54 
        0.011 
Time Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs.  325  325  325  325  325 
Prob.>chi2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Pseudo R2  .1774  .1782  .1841  .1857  .2003 
Notes: z- values in italics, marginal effects in bold. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance 




















Table 3: Robustness Tests 
 
Probit    (6)    (7)    (8)    (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
PRESSURE 
SHOT TO WIN 
0.852**  0.857**  0.855**  0.850**  0.861**  0.852**  0.849** 
2.43  2.46  2.43  2.40  2.36  2.31  2.29 
0.176  0.176  0.176  0.174  0.168  0.163  0.163 
PRESSURE 














-5.73  -5.79  -5.72  -5.48  -5.72  -5.56  -5.55 
-0.445  -0.455  -0.453  -0.438  -0.474  -0.461  -0.460 
LOG CROWD 
SIZE 
0.0887  0.036  0.034 
0.08 
-0.051  3.245  7.101  6.130 
0.20  0.08  0.08  -0.11  -0.40  0.71  0.75 
0.025  0.010  0.010  -0.014  0.873  1.881  1.621 
CROWD SIZE / 
STADIUM   
CAPACITY  
-2.20  -2.478  -2.48  -1.918  1.638  -
22.71*** 
-29.18*** 
-1.07  -1.20  -1.18  -0.89  0.46  -3.94  -4.06 
-0.616  -0.693  -0.693  -0.535  0.441  -6.014  -7.718 
GAME LEVEL   0.151  0.149  0.150  0.169  0.855*  -
8.459*** 
10.669*** 
0.92  0.90  0.90  1.00  1.91  -2.93  -3.32 
0.042  0.042  0.042  0.047  0.230  -2.240  -2.822 
AGE GROUPING  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
INT. EXP.    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
DIFF. EXP.    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
PLAYER 
POSITION 
    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
DOMINANT 
FOOT 
    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
CLUB WORLD 
RANK 
      Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
DIFF CLUB 
RANK 
      Yes  Yes  Yes*  Yes 
WORLD RANK          Yes  Yes  Yes 
DIFF. WORLD 
RANK 
        Yes  Yes  Yes 
FIFA MEMBER 
(YEARS) 
          Yes*  Yes 
DIFF. FIFA 
MEMBER  
          Yes*  Yes 
WORLD CUP 
WINS 




            Yes 
Team Dummies          Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Fixed 
Effects 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs.  325  325  325  325  325  325  325 
Prob.>chi2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001 
Pseudo R2  0.1964  0.2019  0.2021  0.2070  0.2579  0.2676  0.2689 
Notes: z- values in italics, marginal effects in bold. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance 
at the 10% (p < .10), 5% (p < .05) and 1% (p < .01) levels, respectively (see also added factors) such as 
DIFFERENCE WORLD RANK.  
 